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New Phase in Long Battle Against ID Cards


 LALIT has for over three years had the mo-dord: “Go slow on taking up the new ID Card!” There are others, mainly individuals, who prefer the line of: “Mo pa pu donn mo lanprint, mwa!” Ours is part of a political struggle, while individuals take personal stands. The two things are very different. 

 A political mo-dord is not a video game. If we just shoot bang-bang-bang from the hip, or from the thumb, without thinking, we will do harm and we will lose. We are, after all, on the side of the oppressed classes. To win, we need more thinking – much more – than the oppressor classes need.

 And for us in LALIT, winning means something vast: nearing a socialist society, where everyone is not just equal, but also free, and where everything, including the economy, is decided upon by all. That is the common aim we bear in mind in the ID Card struggle. For us, it’s not just a “single issue”.  

 Individual resistance? Self-appointed superior beings? Collective struggle for all?

If individuals just go it alone refusing to take out a Card, some in good faith believing that Government might at the last minute capitulate, others pretending they superior to those who have taken out a Card, or if the leaders of an organization announce a mo-dord that their own members don’t follow, this will obviously not advance the oppressed classes much. Some peoples’ self-images may be pumped up beyond the size of the original. But that is about all. Anyone in a team-sport knows that a whole team playing in harmony against an adversary is what wins. Individual players’ skills, even in football, are important only in the context of the collective effort of a team; otherwise a centre forward could just kick for goal when the start whistle blows, and win! Or, a superior individual could just lie down, go on hunger strike every time a struggle hots up and hey presto, win! (See Appendix I, Ram Seegobin’s article.) The class struggle is a collective struggle, the most important collective struggle of all.

 In LALIT, when we call an end to the go-slow phase against the ID Card, as we did with other organizations in the Kolektif on 10 March, this call is part of an on-going collective struggle – one that we have been in, as a party, for 30 years. The first phase of LALIT’s struggle against ID Cards dates back to 1987. So, we know what we mean when we refer to a “phase in the struggle”. Individuals can play “chicken” and not take out their cards, but, a go-slow can no longer be a mo-dord after the expiry date for taking out cards. We are now entering a new phase.

 From 2013, most people, unfortunately – but there you have it – were bludgeoned by fear or constrained by habits of conformity, into applying for their new card. They are not “inferior” for having done so. Contrary to those who make it a “moralistic” issue, LALIT has from very early put every effort into mobilizing around demands that unify the majority of people who took up their Card with the minority who were in our go-slow. The way we have done this is through attacking the central data base, now destroyed, and at the same time, the entire repressive legal framework of the thing: its compulsory nature, the fact you have to show it to a policeman, the draconian punishment, the police’s access to personal data, and even imperialist secret services’ access. It remains a political battle, one that must be won.

 No to Cannon Fodder tactics

The leadership of a party like LALIT, which is opposing the ruling class and the State, has a responsibility not to take decisions and give mo-dord that expose the most vulnerable people in the movement to the most harassment. That would be using people as cannon fodder, chair à canon in French. The expression comes from the generals on horse-back giving foot-soldiers orders to take up their bayonets to attack the enemy cavalry and its canons.

 As the struggle on ID cards – which is only one single tussle in the battle against repression, which is, in turn, only one single battle in the struggle for socialism – is now changing gear, we have to take stock.

 Till now, LALIT’s mo-dord has been: Pa prese, kamarad! The mo-dord is relative to deadlines. When they are over, the struggle changes. By definition. Our call not to give fingerprints was part of this go-slow. It was proportionate to the existence of a state-controlled permanent central data-base which the success of our collective struggles has since caused to be destroyed by the State.

 Till now, LALIT has ensured that those following our mo-dord don’t suffer undue harassment.

 But from now, as the struggle gets to the bitter end of one of its phases, we approach what will be a battle of attrition if we are not careful.

 As one by one, individuals lose the old card, their passport expires, they need to accompany their mother for an operation abroad, and they are forced to apply, the tactic of refusal will begin to exhaust any movement. Brow-beaten, lonely and feeling a false sense of guilt, people will be forced to submit. This is why maintaining the mo-dord not to take out the card, is wrong.

 And from now on, those refusing to take out a card, who have passports or driver’s licences will be at an advantage over those who do not have them. The higher your class, the safer you are. Those of a higher social class than bank tellers will also, from now onwards, be at a distinct advantage to those of a lower class than bank tellers. The more vulnerable will be picked off from the ranks of those opposing the card.

 Persisting without an exit strategy is just plain irresponsible for an organization, in particular for a political party. Individuals can do what they like. Individuals can just stop their protest at will, go abroad, take out their card when in difficulties, or disappear from sight. They owe no-one anything. Parties cannot. Parties, to survive, have to consider their mo-dord with great care for those following it.

 Just like in any industrial strike action, or in any go-slow at the work-place, there comes a time, a moment, when the leadership has to propose calling it off. What can be gained becomes less than what can be lost. A new tactic must be developed. This time has come in the struggle against the ID Card.

 LALIT has had its “go-slow” mo-dord for over three years. All along, we have successfully drawn into the struggle those from the oppressed classes who have already taken out ID Cards. They, too, are often against the Card. The struggle continues. A single tactic cannot last forever.

 Keep in mind our aim is to help create socialism

Opposing the new ID Card was, and is, a defensive strategy. Should we rely only on defensive strategies, we will never bring in socialism. We can keep our opponents’ points low, but that’s about it. In the game of chess, for example, an individual who plays only defensively can hope for no better than a stalemate. Even if his or her opponent makes mistakes! The oppressor classes, the good news is, make many. The contradictions of capitalism oblige.

 It goes without saying that the ID Card is not LALIT’s only struggle. We have broad strategies that it is part of. A one-off tactic is just not enough, however good it may be. The go-slow has been a good tactic so far. It is about not to be anymore. We need a change in gear – even on this “single issue”. We need a set of new tactics, unifying everyone who is against, to oppose the whole legal framework of compulsory cards.

 It is our strategy that establishes the general principles in the struggle, and this then creates the conditions for tactics to work.

 And incidentally, the high moral ground is something the oppressed classes can attribute to a movement’s leadership when they observe it in action over years. It is not something individuals award themselves.

 The use of tactics

You need tactics, of course. But tactics that further your strategy. As Appendix 2, we list some 36 of the actions (each a tactic) that LALIT has undertaken with other organizations or as a party. And the struggle goes on. But, if your tactics look brilliant but end up eternally keeping you away from your goal, their appearance will eventually cede to reality. The tactics of going to Court, for example, have both helped and hindered the ID Card struggle, but they can harm your political aims.

 Example One: After 20 years of the tactic of litigation by Chagossians, the British State offers them a colonial “re-settlement”. But this is the very opposite of the freedom to return to the island of your birth when you want to. Then the British withdraw the offer – even of re-settlement.

 Example Two: After 10 years of Rezistans litigation, what have they won against the Best Loser System? Nothing. Except the threat by the judgment in their UN case of a new communal census. This is the very opposite of what Rezistans was genuinely seeking.

 A tactic that overstays its utility can be harmful, too. It can lead to crushing disheartenment for all in it.

 The Maturity to Know when to Retreat

And, of course, just like every young footballer dribbling the ball knows, you need to know when to retreat – to avoid a back, or so as to prepare for future attack. Back-passes are useful, too. Enlightened supporters applaud when such tactics are used skilfully. Only mindless crowds boo such moves.

 We now need to forge ahead with a new aim. Not just a refusal by a few people to give their own fingerprints. We need a campaign for the Government to annul the entire legal framework of the card itself, not only its biometric component. And this, as part of a general struggle for more freedom, less surveillance, less repression. And this, in turn, as part of the struggle for socialism. Before listing changes we now call for in the laws, let’s take stock.

 Assessing impressive victories so far

We have three main victories to celebrate so far:

 1. In 2014 general elections and 2015 local elections, the idea of any “pyes idantite” was popularized and even accepted by the authorities, as opposed to a single “kart idantite”.

2. Popular consciousness about the dangers of the new invasive surveillance by electronic means has grown during this campaign 100-fold. On worksites, people began refusing to give thumbprints for registering presence at work, for example. Cameras on buses that had been a trade union demand are now denounced by unions. And so on.

3. The centralized data base has been destroyed. This means that, even if the temporary data is vulnerable, which it is, the State has undertaken not to use it.

 The Political Work before us now: “Repeal the laws behind the ID Card!”

1. Get the Ramgoolam card system scrapped i.e. use it only as a bit of plastic, one possible pyes idantite.

2. Denounce the Jugnauth regime, inter alia, for hypocrisy and repressive intent, for:

a) Not repealing the legal framework.

b) Not scrapping the biometric aspect of the card altogether.

c) Not removing the obligatory nature of the card.

d) Not repealing the law that allows "officers" to force you to present your card.

e) Not even scrapping the draconian fines and prison sentences.

f) Not amending the Data Protection Act to prevent police access to all personal data.

g) Not amending the Data Protection Act to prevent the CIA, the NSA, GCHQ or any other imperialist secret service getting access to data.

h) Not removing the biometric photograph, nor the fingerprints on the card itself, despite the Privy Council judgement.

i) Not even amending the Civil Status Act to prevent addition of further information on the card and in the system.

Let us make both Ramgoolam and Jugnauth pay the political price of this repressive card system!

 Appendix 1:  27 December 2006

Hunger Strikes: “Food-refusal” as a Means of Struggle

 Usually “food refusal” is the prerogative and weapon of the spoilt child. But sometimes in the course of history “food refusal” becomes a potentially powerful tool of struggle – the hunger strike. But this is only possible under exacting conditions, without which, a hunger strike is exposed to the risk of being weak and manipulative, thus counter-productive. Recent debates have tended to portray the “hunger strike” simply as a means to exert some form of blackmail. It is becoming essential that we clear up our ideas on the subject, otherwise there is a risk that we will lose the very powerful tool of struggle that is the hunger strike.

 As organizations, we should be very careful which hunger strikes we encourage our members to participate in. Although, of course, everyone will feel pity for individuals, shattered at losing their jobs or houses, who go on a hunger strike to show their despair. Any support that people give, in such cases, is likely to be only part of a general duty of support to anyone threatening suicide – whether by stopping all food intake or by blowing himself up with a gas cylinder – no more.

 I have thought a lot about the question of hunger strikes, having been on two myself. I know how difficult they are, politically, emotionally and physically. While on hunger strike, one has a lot of time to analyse the action, its theoretical basis as well as practical implications. One shares ideas with other participants who may have slightly different views on the methods and aims of hunger strikes.

As a medical practitioner, hunger-strikers also sometimes call on me, perhaps inappropriately, given that they are voluntarily not eating, so the only medical advice they can expect is that they’ll feel better if they start eating again!

As well as personal experience, history is always a guide.

Most hunger strikes worldwide are those done by a category of people who have very few choices of method: prisoners. Political prisoners often go on hunger strike to get books, pen and paper, for example. The aim, though limited, is noble: for all prisoners to benefit from books and writing materials. The means are reasonable: there are not many options in jail. There are also hunger strikes that are started because people are up against almost impossible odds, like when one is confronted with a creature like an “empire”.

Bobby Sands

Bobby Sands, the famous Irish Republican Army prisoner who stood for election while in jail 25 years ago, died on the 70th day of a water-only hunger strike. His demand: political prisoner status for IRA detainees, better prison conditions for all, and the freedom of Ireland from domination by the British State. Bobby Sands certainly fulfilled the basic criteria for the justification of a hunger strike: he was up against overwhelmingly powerful odds, his demands were part of an overall political strategy, and he had very little other choice of method.

He certainly didn’t consult a doctor after a few days on hunger strike. He was serious. When people like Bobby Sands go on hunger strike, they prepare themselves psychologically to expect to feel sick, to become weak, to suffer discomfort and pain, eventually to become ill, and ultimately, if the conditions set out at the beginning are not met, to risk irreversible damage to their bodies, and to die.

The Suffragettes

British people, too, the Suffragettes who fought a 100 years ago for women’s right to vote, used the hunger strike against the British State that jailed them for their demonstrations. They, like Bobby Sands, had a demand formulated to be in the direct interests of broad sections of the masses. Their demand won increasing support as they continued their hunger strikes. Their aim, as the aim of a hunger strike should be, was to build up, day by day, enough mass support so as to change the balance of forces in society sufficiently so as to force the State to change its policies.


In India’s independence struggle, Mahatma Gandhi used the public hunger strike as a method against the same British State. Again, we note he had demands that could be taken up by the broad masses all over India. Again, we note the action was part of a larger political strategy: for Independence. We also note that Gandhi had a clear strategy. What he was saying was this: “We demand India’s Independence. There is a state of insurrection in India, as the parties working towards Independence gain strength, and there is a risk of violence. However, the people trust me and as long as I am alive and leading them, I can prevent violence”.

He didn’t hope the King of England would feel sorry for him after a couple of weeks of hunger strike. Like Bobby Sands, he was part of a political party. Their actions, as hunger strikers, were part of much larger conscious movements, and this unity around the demands is an important criterion for a successful hunger strike.

Demands in all three hunger strikes against the British State were formulated in such a way that gradually, over the course of the hunger strike, day by day, more and more people in the broad masses understood the demands, agreed with them, felt that they were their own, and as such would begin to act on the basis of the demands.

All three hunger strikes had the political machinery to make use of the hunger strike in order to propagate the demands of the whole movement, and also to mobilize support from more and more people.

August 1979

In 1979, after a week of strike by labourers and artisans for trade union recognition and against mill closures, at a time when the working class’s leading sectors, Dock and Transport unions, were being weakened by VRAC and individual buses, respectively, the rest of the working class consciously joined into what became a general strike “movement”, in order that the labourers and artisans’ unions could get strong enough to take part of the burden of leadership of the working class at this crucial time.

After two weeks’ strike movement, as everyone was aware, there was a state of near-insurrection in the country. The Labour Government in power still refused concessions, while bosses sacked striking workers. It was at this point that a general assembly of workers of the federations involved decided that the strike movement’s leaders, Paul Bérenger, myself and others, would go on a hunger strike. Because of the white-hot state of mobilization, the decision was that we go on hunger strike without food and without water. This is called a “sudden death” hunger strike. It gave us six or seven days to live. This was a conscious choice. It was taken because of the urgency required. There was high mobilization after the two whole weeks of the strike movement, and this needed to be maintained for a few days. The demands were clear: recognition of the sugar industry unions, no to mill closure, and re-integration of sacked strikers.

The hunger strike successfully mobilized thousands and thousands of people. More and more every day. The Jardin Compagnie became the focus for mass demonstrations. Trade union and neighbourhood groups poured in from all over Mauritius. When the riot police acted, and later the SMF, the people began to riposte by turning cars upside down all over the streets of Port Louis.

After four days, the “Lakor 23 Ut” (it’s name still rings in popular memory) was signed: trade union recognition would be on its way, the mills would not be closed, all workers sacked in the strike would be given alternative jobs.

From the hunger strike point of view, there were lessons. A hunger strike being designed to force decision-makers to change their policies, something they do not like doing, creates its own built-in enemy. We realized we had to be in full view of the public 24 hours a day. This was proof we were respecting the hunger strike. We also realized that it was partly the known integrity of hunger strikers that permitted our movement to withstand rumours invented by enemies, including the National Security Service’s whose despicable “job” it often is to do just this.

There was another lesson. Everyone has to be equal in a hunger strike. There were nine of us in the hunger strike indefinitely, and yet, erroneously, there was one from amongst us who would be replaced, he announced, in three days’ time by another member of his party. This particular hunger strike was strong enough to withstand the adverse effects of accepting the offer of an additional “short-term” hunger striker.

September 1980

A year later, the Government had not yet got work for every sacked striker. So the unions concerned planned a new hunger strike, Lagrev Lafen ’80. This time we would take water.  We chose this formula and publicly announced it and its reasoning. We needed time in order to build up the mass movement again so as to force government to give everyone their jobs back. This hunger strike, too, was successful.

It had its lessons, too. One unionist decided at the very last minute “to join in” the hunger strike. This meant he was not psychologically prepared. On the second day, we suspected him of having received food from a visitor, who may have visited the bathroom. Paul Bérenger and I announced to him and the other strikers that we would check that he was on hunger strike like the rest of us, day and night. Three hours later, faced with a real hunger strike, the man had a bad panic spell, with palpitations and all. He had no choice but to pull himself together. Which he did.

Another lesson was that one or two of the participants would bring medical problems to me, a co-hunger striker. Their tummies hurt; they felt weak or dizzy. So, I had to remind everyone we were on hunger strike in order to be unwell, so as a doctor I was no longer of any use. I said I had a good idea why they felt so awful, and I did too. They, like me, hadn’t eaten for many days. And if and when, I said, any of us felt unwell, it was all to the good. If we got really sick, so much the better. Hunger strikes are serious, and, failing victory, we had to face the prospect of illness and death, I concluded my pep talk.

This hunger strike found a vociferous enemy: Elizier Francois. He held public a meeting near the old GWF office on Moka Road where the 1980 hunger strike was held, billed as Jabaljass v/s Grevistes de la Faim trying unsuccessfully to turn the public against us.

Diego Garcia Women

In the 1970’s and ’80s, the women of Chagos had many hunger strikes on the triple demands for compensation & the right to return, the retrocession of Chagos from Britain to Mauritius, and the closing down of the United States’ base on Diego Garcia. Again, like Gandhi and Bobby Sands, the hunger strikers were up against a whole empire. The 1981 hunger strike and the street demonstrations supporting it, forced the British government to negotiate, and to pay the first proper compensation.

The theoretical basis of the hunger strike

Every hunger strike is important, even if poorly planned, generally misunderstood, or plain misguided. Because each one contributes to the way the broad masses see hunger strikes, understand this particular means of struggle and to what extent they are prepared to give support.

The hunger strike is an ultimate weapon, when there is total deadlock in negotiations. Is it aiming simply to provoke a “humanitarian reflex” in the heart of the deciders?  That would be a very hazardous path. The real aim is to increase the political price that the deciders will pay, if they persist in maintaining the deadlock; the real aim is to alter the balance of forces in such a way that negotiations can resume, but on a different footing, more in one’s favour.

To achieve this aim, the action needs to have the sort of credibility that is beyond any questioning. The nature of the strike needs to be widely known, in terms of what exactly are the strikers depriving themselves of: food, water, liquids. It has to be made quite clear under what conditions the strikers will seek medical advice and treatment, and under what conditions they will refuse to be subjected to forced feeding.

But when it comes to changing the balance of forces, the absolutely central element is the “Support Committee” that is constituted around the action: a support committee that is logical in its content and where the strikers themselves have the final say. But at the same time it needs to be the sort of support committee that is capable of taking decisions, should the strikers reach a state where rational decisions are difficult, if not impossible. The Support Committee also determines the team of negotiators that will take up further negotiations when necessary. Perhaps the central role of the support committee is to constantly exclude the pack of vultures that will inevitably gather, with their own agenda. There will always be the temptation to accept support from wherever it comes, but it has to be born in mind that some support can do more harm than good to the cause.


The demands, if one expects mass support, need to be presented in their general nature: not only to win an advantage for the participants or some small group of people, but to advance a cause that the broad masses can be part of. The hunger strike needs also to be part of an on-going, consciously fought, history-making struggle. It must be clear how the hunger strike re-enforces the on-going movement.

The economic and social context also needs to be taken into consideration when the demands are formulated. If, as in the context of the recent hunger strike, 8,000 labourers and artisans of the sugar industry are being laid off with a VRS-type package quite similar to the one offered to the 200 DWC workers, it is counter-productive not to constantly draw the paralell. There is frequently an erroneous belief that a solution to a problem is easier to reach if that particular problem is kept in strict isolation, but this reasoning somehow ignores the absolute necessity to change the balance of forces in one’s favour.

So hunger strikes are fraught with difficulty. We all have a duty to defend the credibility of this weapon of struggle, especially at a time when all reasonable demands run the risk of coming up against the same old argument of “There is no alternative”, when the “logic” of economic measures is presented as “not negotiable”, even when they cause great hardship to large numbers of people.

Ram Seegobin, For LALIT

Appendix 2: 18 August, 2015


Here is a rough list of some 36 actions that LALIT believes contributed to the destruction as from Monday of the Central Data-base of biometric data. Some were by LALIT alone, aothers together with staunch allies in unions and associations.

1. An initial Petition signed by 18 prominent organizations: Circulated by the ad-hoc common front called Kolektif kont Kart Biometrik Obligatwar, set up jointly by LALIT and the Confederation Travailleurs Secteur Prive. Submitted to Acting PM Hon R. Beebeejaun. 28 Sept, 2013. Following this, M. Rao Rama, the Project Co-ordinator in the PMO attacked LALIT member Alain Ah-Vee. Organizations in the Collective are: CTSP, CITU, Centre Goomany, LPT, FTU, ACIM, MLF, Playgroup, Labaz Intersindikal, JUSTICE, Ass. Travailleurs Sociaux, Abaim, Regrupman Travayer Sosyal, University of Mauritius Students union, Albatross Senior Citizens, Nursing Association, First Aiders.

2. LALIT calls for a GO SLOW. On 24 December, 2013, LALIT announced that it was calling for a “go-slow” from the public, which was widely followed.

3. A new petition submitted signed by 23 organizations: Submitted to the Prime Minister on 17 April, 2014, together with a joint appeal to join the “GO SLOW”.

4. LALIT contacted Village Council Presidents and Committee members in over a 100 villages.  This decentralized action over 3 months involved personal visits and the distribution of an open letter, Dec 2013 to Feb 2014.

5. Poster Campaign: Posters against central data base all over Mauritius Bizin Refiz donn Guvernman Lanprint.

6. LALIT leaflets distributed, 25 Sept 2013, heading, “Kifer LALIT dir Non a Nuvo Kart ID Biometrik?”

7. Magazine REVI LALIT Special Issue No. 112 was against the compulsory biometric ID Card system (plus articles in other magazine numbers, including 111, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119).

8. At a key moment, aiming to unify those who were on the go-slow with others who had had to take out ID Cards, LALIT called for the destruction of the centralized data-base.

9. LALIT served a citizens “Notice” on all staff at MNIC offices: This decentralized action, warned staff not to act illegally and against the Constitution by putting pressure on members of the public to give biometric data for storage. From 30 March 2014.

10. LALIT held a “Teach in” on the ID Card system, 1 Dec, 2013.

11. The Collective LALIT and CTSP held a Workshop at the CTSP offices in Rose-Hill.

12. A LALIT speaker a debate organized by Foi et Vie, at the ICJM, 9 Nov 2013 challenged and won against M Rao Rama.

13. Passive Resistance action at the Registrar General’s Building by which dozens of people queued up to take out ID Cards, but refused biometric data, and submitted a letter (enclosed for Data Commissioner’s perusal) 23 July 2014.

14. LALIT supplied letters for individuals who wanted to join this passive resistance.

15. Common Declaration against Compulsory Biometric ID Cards, signed by 25 Personalities, including two former Presidents of the Republic, two former Justice Ministers. Organized by LALIT Feb 2014.

16. Four Press Conferences of organizations against the biometric ID Cards, 6 Sept 2013, and 16 Apr, 2014, 11 Jul, 2014 (at GTU), and LALIT had already held the first one on 23 July, 2012.

17. Protest Actions outside Factories and Universities, etc. Another decentralized series of actions. Distribution of leaflets re dangers of biometric information being taken by force and stored, just before the MNIC officers were due to go on to the sites to take fingerprints, e.g. Princess Tuna, Thon de Mascareignes, UBS garage, CNT garages, University of Mauritius. Oct, 2013.

18. Research by LALIT on the financial ramifications behind the project, published by LALIT; what happened, in fact to the Rs 1.5 billion deal, masked by the fig-leaf of Government-to-Government contract with Government of Singapore, and how the money ended up in pro-Labour Party firms including BAI.

19. Le Mauricien Forum article, “Save us From our Protectors” 21 October 2013.

20  Key Radio Programs on Top FM and Radio Plus, by Lindsey Collen that set the ball rolling against the biometric ID cards.

21. LALIT aimed to get the two main Opposition Parties at the time, MSM and MMM, to change their positions. In fact, both did. For example, LALIT delegated a member to telephone Paul Berenger as Opposition Leader to propose Parliamentary Questions.

22. LALIT wrote the DPP an open letter, calling for him to say whether he would prosecute those who did not give biometric data. He replied on 27 June, 2014, saying “It is a fact that until there is a final pronouncement of the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Act, it would be unlikely for me as DPP to exercise my powers under Section 72 of the Constitution to initiate criminal proceedings against those persons who have failed without reasonable excuse to apply for the new Identity card ...” This public stand opened up democratic space for the go-slow to continue apace.

23. LALIT member Lindsey Collen’s Youtube Clip, created by Rada Kistnasamy and Emilie Wiehe against ID Card had a record number of visits: Over 18,000. Posted 28 Sept, 2013. This provoked a fine debate.

24. LALIT’s Electoral Program had a chapter on the ID Card Sept, 2014.

25. LALIT dedicated two of its electoral programs on MBC TV and Radio to the ID Card. LALIT member Shabeela Kalla spoke.

26. LALIT YouTube by Shabeela Kalla on the ID Card, 30 Sept 2014. 1,000 viewers.

27. LALIT exposed contradictions in the Labour Government: Published a “table” showing the different lines coming from the PMO and the Minister of ICT, Hon. Pillay’s office. 15 Oct, 2013.

28. LALIT call for rescinding of contract with Singapore Firm, at the time when the MMM Opposition called for this, 1 Nov 2012,

29. LALIT pasted up small posters saying, “Pa prese kamarad!” August 2014, countrywide.

30. Door-to-door visits: LALIT chose areas in which to concentrate on a thorough go slow, by explaining in detail, household by household, what the dangers are.

31. Joint Communiqué by 9 Organizations: 9 Sept 2014, Call for Deadline to be extended to Dec 2015.

32. LALIT sent a letter to all MPs and Ministers in the new Lepep Alliance in power, who had taken position against the biometric ID cards to ensure that the Lepep promise was kept. 12 Feb 2015

33. Petition signed by 8 organizations to new Lepep Government, to respect its program. 30 Dec 2014.

34. Letter to Prime Minister following Supreme Court Judgment and Injunction, 12 July, 2015, signed by 11 organizations.

35. Letter to Minister of TCI, Hon. Jugnauth (12 July, 2015), and re-sent to Hon. Bhadain, 4 Aug 2015.

36. Constant meetings and co-ordination with other groups and common fronts and individuals in the country, in the generalized protest movement. LALIT members also kept regular contact with the three different groups that had Supreme Court Cases against the ID Cards.